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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DENNIS C. O’BRIEN, 
 





ARCHABBOT DOUGLAS NOWICKI; 
JACK PERRY; 
SAINT VINCENT ARCHABBEY, 
an unincorporated association 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-00979) 
Honorable Terrence F. McVerry, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Filed:  January 9, 2013) 
______________ 
 






 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from an order of the District 
Court entered on March 14, 2012, adopting a report and recommendation of a magistrate 
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judge dated January 27, 2012, as its opinion and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss.  
Plaintiff, now appellant, Dennis C. O’Brien, a citizen of California, brought this action 
against Archabbot Douglas Nowicki, Jack Perry, and Saint Vincent Archabbey, citizens 
of Pennsylvania, in the District Court for the Northern District of California but that court 
transferred the action to the Western District of Pennsylvania.   The case is predicated on 
O’Brien’s allegation that from August 1966 until May 1970, a period in which he was a 
student at Saint Vincent Scholasticate, a boarding high school, in Latrobe, Pennsylvania, 
he was subjected to sexual abuse, the consequences of which still affect him.  Though 
O’Brien does not seek a recovery on the basis of the alleged abuse he suffered as a 
student, he does seek damages on theories of negligence, recklessness and fraud in the 
implementation of a counseling and assistance program formulated by the Archabbey to 
assist persons who had been victims of sexual abuse in the Archabbey’s operations.  
O’Brien included Perry as a defendant because he was the Archabbey’s Delegate for 
Child Protection and became involved in O’Brien’s case when he sought assistance from 
the program. 
 After the California district court transferred the case to the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, the District Court referred to a magistrate judge who considered and 
recommended granting a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that the 
defendants, now appellees, had filed.  In the magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation, she cited Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556-57, 127 
S.Ct. 1955, 1965-66 (2007), and other cases for the point that a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) must be granted if a complaint does not set forth a claim for relief that is 
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plausible on its face or does not allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for his alleged misconduct.  The magistrate judge then went on to 
explain that O’Brien did not contend that defendants were liable for his abuse as a 
student, as any such claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations.  Rather, 
he contended that they were liable for breach of a present duty for their actions in the 
implementation of their current assistance program in which he had participated.1
 In the course of her report and recommendation the magistrate judge made the 
following astute observation: 
 
The Court observes the public policy considerations weighing strongly 
against imposing liability on private organizations electing to afford 
gratuitous assistance and/or remediation to alleged victims of otherwise 
time-barred wrongs.  If by proffering a gratuitous, measured response an 
institution exposed itself to legal liability premised on second-guessing the 
nature of its investigation or remediation, the effect would be chilling, if not 
preclusive. 
 
Sup. App. at 6. 
 
 Of course, the magistrate judge, in addition to setting forth the above policy 
considerations weighing against O’Brien’s action, also carefully considered his claims on 
a strictly legal basis.  Ultimately she concluded that defendants “owed (a) no general duty 
as to the claims alleged and (b) no particularized duties to [O’Brien] other than those 
arising from his attendance as a student forty (40) years ago – as to which the statute of 
limitations has long expired.”  Thus, she recommended that the District Court grant 
defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
                                              
1 In his brief O’Brien agrees with the magistrate judge, that, if he made any direct claim 
for child abuse, the statute of limitations would have barred the claim. 
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 The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation was referred to the District 
Court and O’Brien filed timely objections to it.  The Court, after considering the entire 
record, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation as its own opinion and 
granted the motion to dismiss.  This appeal followed.  The District Court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  We exercise 
plenary review on this appeal.3
 After our plenary review of this matter we are in full accord with the magistrate 
judge and thus, by extension, the District Court and have very little to add to their 
opinion.
 
4  See Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Tricenturion, Inc.
                                              
2 In point of fact O’Brien did not allege that he is a citizen of California and defendants 
are citizens of Pennsylvania.  Rather, he pleaded that they were residents of their 
respective states.  Of course, citizenship and residency are not synonymous.  See 
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 338-39, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1847-48 (1983).  Thus, in 
view of our obligation to satisfy ourselves that the District Court had jurisdiction we 
would be justified if we dismissed this appeal and remanded the case to the District Court 
with instructions that it dismiss the action.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau 
v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990).  Nevertheless, we are not 
doing so as we are satisfied from our review of the case that the parties are citizens of 
their states of residence.   
, 694 F.3d 340, 
350 (3d Cir. 2012).  We note, however, that regardless of how a counseling program is 
established it always would be possible to challenge aspects of it.  Furthermore, we 
 
3 We are surprised that O’Brien in his brief indicates that “[r]eview by the Court of 
Appeals is not a trial de novo.  Appellant must demonstrate that the lower court decision 
was an obvious error, a misapplication of the law and/or an abuse of discretion.”  
Appellant’s br. at 8.  Thus, he places a higher burden on himself than the cases require.  
Of course, we apply the correct standard of review on this appeal. 
 
4 O’Brien includes the following sentence in his brief.  “He has attempted to be as clear 
and concise as possible and requests that the Court read the brief entirely and analyze the 
issues fully before rendering its decision.”  Appellant’s br. at 1.  Of course, the parties 
may be certain that we have done exactly that.   
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observe that O’Brien’s participation in the program was entirely voluntary and he was 
free to withdraw from it at any time.  Moreover, we reiterate and expand on the District 
Court opinion and point out that, if we permit this matter to proceed, institutions such as 
the Archabbey will be reluctant to establish programs such as that involved here and 
expose themselves to litigation with respect to the design or implementation of the 
programs.5
 We make a final but important point.  We recognize that institutions such as the 
Archabbey might establish a counseling program in the hope of avoiding litigation by 
diverting a potential claimant into the program.  We, however, are not concerned with 
such a consideration in this case because O’Brien was permitted to participate in the 
program even though by his own admission he would not have been successful if he had 
brought an action for the sexual abuse he allegedly suffered as a student as his claim 
would have been barred by the statute of limitations. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons the order of March 14, 2012, will be affirmed. 
                                              
5 We are well aware that there have been many cases in which allegations similar to those 
that O’Brien makes with respect to child abuse have been made and we can take judicial 
notice of that circumstance.  See Fed. R. Evid. 201.  Indeed, we have dealt with such 
cases ourselves.  See Elliot v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Accordingly, O’Brien’s underlying claim surely is not of an isolated nature.  Thus, it is 
important that the courts not discourage implicated institutions from developing 
assistance and counseling programs. 
